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Abstract 
Conceptualization in theory development has received limited consideration despite its 
frequently stressed importance in Information Systems research. This paper focuses on the 
role of construct clarity in conceptualization, arguing that construct clarity should be 
considered an essential criterion for evaluating conceptualization and that a focus on construct 
clarity can advance conceptualization methodology. Drawing from Facet Theory literature, we 
formulate a set of principles for assessing construct clarity, particularly regarding a construct’s 
relationships to its extant related constructs. Conscious and targeted attention to this criterion 
can promote a research ecosystem more supportive of knowledge accumulation. 
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1 Introduction 
Constructs are invented by researchers to designate conceptual abstractions of phenomena 
(Kaplan 1964). They are the basic building blocks of theory (Weber 2012). The conceptual 
meaning of a construct is specified through conceptualization (Schwab 1980). Given the 
frequently stressed importance of constructs, appropriate conceptualization is vital. 
This paper discusses conceptualization in theory development. Conceptualization is 
differentiated from operationalization wherein relevant empirical measures of a construct are 
identified. Our discussion focuses primarily on conceptualization. Though conceptualization 
and operationalization must be consistent, they are usually characterized as separate phases 
according to their temporal occurrence (e.g., MacKenzie et al. 2011). Most researchers would 
agree that conceptualization should precede operationalization; that is, the meaning of a 
construct is determined before associating measures with it1,2. Note that, although the terms 
“construct” and “concept” can be differentiated, for simplicity we treat them as synonymous 
1 Alternatively, one might advocate for defining the meaning of a construct according to its empirical 
measures, the underpinning rationale of which is often called operationalism or operationism. 
Operationalism, irrespective of its associated advantages, has historically received much criticism, 
particularly regarding limited generalizability of empirically defined constructs (Cook and Campbell 
1979). 
2 The meaning of a construct can also be modified subsequent to its operationalization (Schwab 1980). 
Given that modification of meaning will create a new construct that differs from the original one, there 
is a need to operationalize the modified construct again. Hence, the logical order from conceptualization 
to operationalization remains unchanged even when a construct’s meaning is modified after 
operationalization. 
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throughout this paper; we use both terms because they have been used interchangeably in the 
literature. 
Given the criticality of conceptualization in theory development, how conceptualization can be 
effectively carried out remains an important research question. Generally, researchers 
consider two categories of quality criteria relevant to conceptualization – (i) construct clarity 
and (ii) construct validity. Schwab (1980, pp. 5-6) defined construct validity as “representing 
the correspondence between a construct (conceptual definition of a variable) and the 
operational procedure to measure or manipulate that construct.” There are widely accepted 
procedures for establishing construct validity (e.g., MacKenzie et al. 2011; Petter et al. 2007; 
Straub et al. 2004). Moreover, construct validity pertains mainly to operationalization 
(Suddaby 2010). This paper focuses discussion on the first category of criteria – construct 
clarity – that has received relatively less attention in the literature. In particular, we are 
interested in: how can conceptualization achieve greater construct clarity? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the subsequent section, we use the 
example of Information Technology Value to illustrate the importance of construct clarity in 
conceptualization. We then engage more deeply with a discussion about achieving various 
aspects of construct clarity in conceptualization. We focus on one critical aspect – clarity in 
terms of a construct’s relationships to extant related constructs. By drawing from Facet Theory 
literature, we formulate a set of principles and explore how this set of principles might be used 
to guide conceptualization toward greater construct clarity. We discuss how future research 
might be informed by these ideas. This paper concludes with a summary and a consideration 
of limitations. 
2 A Case from the IT Value Research Field 
Information Technology (IT) value often implicitly serves as an “umbrella” notion (Hirsch and 
Lewin 1999), broadly referring to the various consequences of using IT or Information Systems 
(IS), and subsuming similar terms such as IT business value (Kohli and Grover 2008; Melville 
et al. 2004), IS success (DeLone and McLean 1992), and IS effectiveness (Grover et al. 1996). 
Few would deny that IT value is among the most important and widely employed concepts in 
the IS field. Research concerned with the implementation and use of IT often employs IT value 
as a dependent variable (Shang and Seddon 2002; Burton-Jones and Straub 2006). In 
practice, senior managers need to know the expected and realized value from IT investments 
(Hitt et al. 2002; Murphy and Simon 2002).  
In the research field of IT value, a plethora of studies addressing related issues have been 
published over the decades (Schryen 2012; DeLone and McLean 1992). Despite periodic 
naysayers questioning whether IT generates value (e.g., Carr 2003), most studies report 
positive (direct or indirect) contribution from IT investment to firms’ economic and business 
performance (e.g., Dedrick et al. 2003; Im et al. 2001; Rai et al. 1997). 
Extensive and continuing interest in IT value has generated diverse theoretical and empirical 
approaches to its study (c.f. Kohli and Grover 2008; Dedrick et al. 2003; DeLone and McLean 
1992; 2003). In particular, IT value is investigated at different levels of analysis (e.g., individual 
level versus organizational level [Chan 2000; Petter et al. 2008]), with various intents (e.g., 
predicting empirical relationships [Devaraj and Kohli 2003] versus explaining theoretical 
phenomena [Rai et al. 2002]), or using various data collection methods (e.g., panel data [Hitt 
et al. 2002] versus perceptual data [Gable et al. 2008]).  
Concomitant with this diversity is growing concern with possible incomparability across 
research findings (e.g., Grover et al. 1996; Seddon et al. 1999); such incomparability can be a 
potential hindrance to knowledge accumulation3 (Melville et al. 2004; Wade and Hulland 
3 Though several frameworks are proposed to improve comparability across diverse IT value studies 
through identifying their differentiating aspects such as the type of IT investigated and the level of 
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2004). One factor that can frustrate comparability is inadequate clarity in IT value 
conceptualization. 
IT value can be selectively emphasized. As argued by Petter et al. (2012), the focus of IT value 
research can change over time. In the early days of computing when the technology was used 
primarily as a calculator for computing-intensive tasks, the accuracy of calculation was an 
important concern for defining IT value. As IT functionality expanded and human-computer 
interaction became increasingly widespread, other aspects of IT value such as usefulness and 
user satisfaction came to the fore. 
Another variable is the way in which IT is used. Waves of technology innovation can alter how 
users interact with IT and with each other. For instance, the increasing accessibility of mobile 
devices can move the virtual workplace from the sole use of an organizational PC to the 
simultaneous use of multiple platforms; this change can reshape the value dimension of IT 
(e.g., the capability of synchronizing digital content across multiple platforms becomes more 
important than ever). Moreover, a collaborative effort by multiple firms to leverage IT can 
similarly redefine the meaning of IT value (e.g., relational or collaborative benefit in the longer 
term must be considered) (Kohli and Grover 2008). 
Yet, extant IT value dimensions rarely disappear in conjunction with the emergence of new 
aspects of IT value; thus conceptions tend to accumulate. Although new value dimensions for 
mobile devices need to be captured, decades-old aspects such as system quality and 
information quality (DeLone and McLean 1992) may still remain fundamental and relevant for 
conceptualizing IT value. When new aspects of IT value arise from changing IT or IT use 
contexts, the onus is on the researcher to consider the continuing relevance of extant 
dimensions. 
Conceptualization is further confused and complicated, as few studies are explicit and precise 
in articulating their conceptualization of IT value. For example, IT value is labelled variously 
as “benefits”, “perceived value”, “impact”, and “business value” deriving from IT or IS (DeLone 
and McLean 2003), while important distinctions such as “who perceives the value”, “value for 
whom”, and “what kinds of value are business value” remain unclear (cf. Grover et al. 1996; 
Seddon et al. 1999). 
The example of IT value research suggests merit in paying greater attention to concept clarity 
in conceptualization. Among possible related issues, this paper centres on general 
conceptualization “goals”. Conceptualization can be better guided and more effective with 
explicit awareness of goals or criteria for good conceptualization. 
To avoid misleading reader expectations, brief clarification of the research scope is necessary. 
Rather than a comprehensive solution to the methodology of conceptualization, this paper 
offers exploratory considerations with regard to the qualities of a clear conceptualization. 
In particular, we set aside how to conceptualize clearly and instead move up to a meta-
theoretical level, investigating what a clear conceptualization is. Addressing this meta-
theoretical question may inform targeted and mindful practice of conceptualization. In other 
words, a deeper understanding of what strong conceptualization is may help us understand 
how such conceptualization can be achieved. This paper addresses the first link in this chain of 
understanding: what are the qualities of a clear conceptualization? 
3 A Focus on Construct Clarity in Conceptualization 
“The need for developing precise concepts […] cannot be overstated” (Osigweh 1989, p. 579). 
Clear concepts or constructs can be defined as “robust categories that distil phenomena into 
sharp distinctions that are comprehensible to a community of researchers” (Suddaby 2010, p. 
346). Van de Ven (2007, p. 116) noted “what makes definitions of terms significant is that they 
analysis chosen (e.g., Grover et al. 1996; Seddon et al. 1999), these attempts have achieved limited 
success. 
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classify the universe into ways that are critical to a theory; or as Plato said, they ‘carve at the 
joints.’” In a 2010 editorial in Academy of Management Review, Suddaby (2010) noted that 
lack of construct clarity is a common reason that reviewers and editors reject manuscripts. His 
view on the importance of construct clarity is echoed and amplified in several recent articles 
(e.g., Klein and Delery 2012; Locke 2012; Skilton 2011; Yaniv 2011).  
In the IS discipline, Markus and Saunders (2007, p. v) emphasized construct clarity when 
outlining the characteristics required in Theory and Review papers submitted to MIS 
Quarterly. These characteristics include: 
• Clear conceptualizations of concepts unique to Information Systems research (e.g., 
the “IT artefact”) 
• Clear conceptualizations of concepts relevant to Information Systems practice (i.e., 
“action levers” or interventions such as prototyping, training, etc.). 
Furthermore, Weber (2012) noted that a clearly defined construct is able to delineate the 
boundary conditions of what phenomena are included and what are not included in a theory. 
Constructs should be precisely defined, otherwise it is not possible to distinguish to which 
empirical phenomena the theory can apply and to which it cannot (Weber 2012). An unclear 
construct with ambiguous meaning will jeopardize construct validity (Schwab 1980). 
Suddaby (2010) offered relatively more structured analysis for thinking about construct clarity. 
He outlined four essential components of construct clarity – (1) definitions, (2) scope 
conditions, (3) relationships between constructs, and (4) coherence. He suggested a good 
definition of a construct should achieve three things – it should “effectively capture the 
essential properties and characteristics of the concept or phenomenon under consideration”, 
“should avoid tautology or circularity”, and “should be parsimonious” (Suddaby 2010, p. 347). 
The scope conditions of a construct need to make clear the contextual conditions under which 
the construct will or will not apply, specifically with regards to the three general categories of 
space, time, and values. For relationships between constructs, Suddaby (2010) posited that two 
kinds of relationships should be clarified: (i) a construct’s relationships to other constructs in 
a nomological network and (ii) a construct’s relationships to extant related constructs that 
share conceptual meaning. The fourth component of construct clarity is coherence; coherence 
requires that the previous three criteria of construct clarity – definitions, scope conditions, and 
relationships between constructs – need to be organized in a logically consistent way (Suddaby 
2010). 
The first two components of construct clarity suggested by Suddaby (2010) – definitions and 
scope conditions - are relatively well attended to in the methodological literature (e.g., 
MacKenzie et al. 2011; Nunnally and Bernstein 1994; Schwab 1980; Weber 2012). The last 
component of coherence, though important, demands a degree of intuitiveness and usually 
relies on one’s capabilities (Suddaby 2010); thus its practice may be less amenable to 
normative prescriptions. We focus our attention on addressing the third component of 
construct clarity – clarity in the relationships between constructs, the difficulty of which may 
be a reason it has not been well addressed. 
Suddaby (2010) suggested that clarity in the relationships between constructs requires two 
separate considerations. First, a construct’s relationships to other constructs in a nomological 
network must be clear. This consideration is widely appreciated. According to Cronbach and 
Meehl (1955), a nomological network causally relates theoretical constructs to each other, or 
theoretical constructs to observables. If constructs differ within a nomological network, they 
are said to be qualitatively distinct. For example, “usefulness”, “ease of use”, and “intention to 
use” are distinct because their nomological network has been evidenced by good empirical 
support (Davis 1989). 
Yet, the use of a nomological network cannot address clarity in the second type of relationship: 
a construct’s relationships to extant, related constructs that have developed historically along 
with the focal construct (Suddaby 2010). This kind of relationship demands a consideration 
separate from the nomological network, because the meanings of these constructs may, and 
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often do, “overlap” or “measure the same thing” to some extent. To demonstrate cumulative 
knowledge progression, strong conceptualization should specify the relationships of a focal 
construct with extant constructs that may share conceptual meaning (Suddaby 2010). Because 
it is unproductive to label a construct differently and assume it to be new, it is critical to ensure 
a new construct is indeed conceptually distinct from extant related constructs. 
Aside from Suddaby (2010), other scholars4 similarly noted the importance and difficulty of 
clarifying the relationships between constructs in achieving construct clarity. Drawing from 
Osigweh (1989), Van de Ven (2007) summarized two general approaches for defining the 
meaning of a construct, termed semantic and constitutive definitions. He submitted (Van de 
Ven 2007, p. 115), 
A semantic definition describes the meaning of a term by its similarities and 
differences with other terms. Reference to synonyms and antonyms, as well as 
metaphors and analogies are useful heuristics for developing semantic definitions. 
[…] A constitutive definition describes a term with reference to its component parts. 
[…] While semantic definitions specify the meaning of a concept by extension (i.e., how 
it is similar to and different from other concepts at the same level of abstraction), 
constitutive definitions locate the meaning of a concept by intention (i.e., what 
component terms comprise the concept at lower levels of abstraction, and what more 
aggregate terms the concept is a member of at high levels of abstraction). 
This comparing and contrasting strategy in defining a construct is also suggested by several 
other scholars. MacKenzie et al. (2011) recommended that the definition of a construct should 
specify attributes or characteristics that are common to the focal construct and other similar 
constructs. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) argued that defining a construct not only requires 
the explication of its conceptual domain but also adequately addressing how the construct is 
different from other constructs. 
Previous researches that recommend comparison and contrast for achieving construct clarity 
do not explicitly offer a systematic approach. Toward such a systematic approach, we consider 
a set of principles for assessing clarity in a construct’s relationships to extant related 
constructs. We hope these principles may help to increase clarity in conceptualization. Beyond 
what is discussed, it is also necessary to pay fuller attention to other criteria sets suggested by 
Suddaby (2010) and others. 
4 Principles for Guiding Conceptualization 
Drawing from Facet Theory literature, we offer a set of principles for exploring construct clarity 
in conceptualization. These principles are adapted from McGrath (1968, pp. 192 – 197); they 
describe the relationships between a focal construct and other similar or potentially 
overlapping constructs. In what follows, we briefly summarize Facet Theory and identify its 
knowledge contribution to various disciplines and areas, critically assessing its strengths and 
shortcomings. Next, we direct attention to the imagery of Facet Theory and the logic derived 
from the imagery. 
4.1 Facet Theory 
In the discipline of Psychology, or more precisely, its sub-discipline Psychometrics, Guttman 
(1954a; 1954b) proposed Facet Theory (FT) in response to concerns arising from the 
arbitrariness of definition. Guttman (1971, p. 329) noted, 
Definitions are of course arbitrary. […] One can make words mean what one wishes 
[… hence,] all that is formally required of a definition is that it be clear: that it enable 
reliable use of the concept concerned. A more informal, heuristic, desideratum is that 
it actually influence[s] theorists and researchers to progress in their work. 
4 We thank the special issue editor for pointing us to this relevant body of literature. 
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The solution for “reliable use” of a concept offered by Guttman is to put the focal concept 
together with concepts that share meaning in a definitional framework “to make explicit what 
the focal concept has in common with the others and how it differs from them” (Guttman 1971, 
p. 329). The entirety of related concepts is presumed to form a content universe within a 
domain of investigation.  
A core activity in Facet Theory is the construction of a definitional framework (Guttman 1954a; 
1954b). To understand what a definitional framework looks like, the notion of a facet remains 
centrally relevant. According to Guttman and Greenbaum (1998, p. 17, emphasis added), 
A facet is a set of attributes (variables) that together represent underlying 
conceptual and semantic components within a content universe. Shye and Elizur 
(1994, p. 23) define the facet as a "set that plays the role of a component set of a 
Cartesian set." In mathematical terminology the word "set" refers to a collection of 
items or objects. Within a set, objects are called "elements." Facets are proposed by 
the investigator and are comprised of elements that define the different values 
logically describing the variations within a facet (Brown, 1985, p. 22). 
For example, consider three concepts related to satisfaction: user satisfaction (Wixom and 
Todd 2005), user information satisfaction (Ives et al. 1983), and end-user computing 
satisfaction (Doll and Torkzadeh 1988). User satisfaction refers to “the attitude that a user has 
toward an information system” (Wixom and Todd 2005, p. 87), whereas user information 
satisfaction is defined as “the extent to which users believe the information system available to 
them meets their information requirements” (Ives et al. 1983, p. 785). End-user computing 
satisfaction refers to “the affective attitude towards a specific computer application by someone 
who interacts with the application directly” (Doll and Torkzadeh 1988, p. 261).  
If the three concepts related to satisfaction were the only ones under investigation, they would 
comprise the content universe. Further, the three concepts share a common skeleton: they all 
refer to an evaluative response toward some evaluative target (Melone 1990; Muylle et al. 
2004). Hence, two facets can be accordingly considered: evaluative response and evaluative 
target (see Table 1). Evaluative response has two elements or values: attitude and belief. 
Evaluative target also has two elements: information system and computer application. The 
three concepts, user satisfaction, user information satisfaction, and end-user computing 
satisfaction can be contrasted according to the two facets of evaluative response and evaluative 
target. Notably, there can be other facets not included (e.g., evaluative stakeholder with 
elements of user, senior manager, developer, vendor, consultant, and so on). We simplified the 
example for illustration. 
 
Facet User Satisfaction User Information Satisfaction 
End-User Computing 
Satisfaction 
A: Evaluative Response A[1]: Attitude A[2]: Belief A[1]: Attitude 
B: Evaluative Target B[1]: Information System B[1]: Information System B[2]: Computer Application 
Table 1. An Example of Facets 
Based on the above facets and elements of facets, user satisfaction can be characterized 
uniquely by a combination of elements, denoted as “A[1]B[1]”. Similarly, user information 
satisfaction and end-user computing satisfaction can be characterized as “A[2]B[1]” and “A[1]B[2]” 
respectively.  
Guttman (1954a; 1954b) does not explicitly define what a definitional framework is. A 
definitional framework or more specifically a facet definitional framework must include a full 
collection of facets and elements of the facets that are used to describe the relationships among 
concepts in a content universe. Further, when a facet definitional framework is used to describe 
a content universe, every concept in the content universe should effectively correspond to a 
unique sequence of elements (e.g., in the prior example “user satisfaction” identified as 
“A[1]B[1]”) (Guttman and Greenbaum 1998). 
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In addition to facets and elements of the facets, a definitional framework contains mapping 
sentences. Argued by Guttman and Greenbaum (1998, p. 16, emphasis added), 
A mapping sentence (Shye, 1978, p. 413), is "a verbal statement of the domain and 
of the range of a mapping, including verbal connectives between facets as in ordinary 
language." It always consists of two main parts: a formal part made up of the facets 
and a less formal part comprising the phrases linking the facets together (Shye, 1978, 
pp. 179-180; Hans, Bernstein, & Marcus, 1985; Levy, 1990). 
An example of a mapping sentence is depicted in Figure 1 (adapted from Guttman and 
Breenbaum [1998, p. 16]). This mapping sentence summarizes the various possible definitions 
for intelligence. By selecting from any combination of values in the three facets (e.g., a1, b2, 
and c1), a specific definition for intelligence can be created (e.g., one concept of intelligence 
can be defined as “the performance of examinee through oral expression on an item presented 
orally by the tester with the aid of numerical language, and requiring inference”.). There are a 
total of 27 (3x3x3) possible definitions for intelligence. 
 
Figure 1. An Example of a Mapping Sentence (adapted from Guttman and Breenbaum 
[1998, p. 16]) 
4.2 Facet Theory Methodology 
The original intent of Facet Theory was to provide “a systematic approach to facilitating theory 
construction, research design, and data analysis for complex studies, that is particularly 
appropriate to the behavioural and social sciences” (Guttman and Greenbaum 1998, p. 13).  
According to Guttman and Greenbaum (1998, p. 16), Guttman’s (1954a) “theory” refers to 
an hypothesis of a correspondence between a definitional system for a universe of 
observations, together with a rationale for such an hypothesis.  
In other words, “theory” as the term is employed by Guttman, consists primarily of several 
parts: a definitional framework for a content universe, a set of empirical observations, a 
hypothetical correspondence between the definitional framework and the set of empirical 
observations, as well as a rationale underlying the hypothetical correspondence. This 
definition of “theory” differs from many contemporary views. For example, Sutton and Staw 
(1995) argued that theory must explain “why variables or constructs come about or why they 
are connected” (p. 375); for them, a list of variables or a construct alone is not theory (Sutton 
and Staw 1995). 
Typically, the process of Guttman’s (1954a) “theory” construction starts with articulating a 
definitional framework for a content universe and ends with examining the correspondence 
between the definitional framework and empirical data. In particular, once a mapping sentence 
is created, each alternative definition in a mapping sentence can act as a survey scale to 
measure the corresponding concept. After all the concepts in a content universe are used to 
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assess an empirical sample, the ratings of the scales are expected to exhibit a similar pattern of 
closeness as the concepts in the content universe (Guttman and Greenbaum 1998). If two 
concepts differ only in one facet out of many, the meanings of the two concepts can be regarded 
as relatively close (in other words they overlap to a greater extent); in principle, the ratings of 
the two concepts in an empirical sample would also be close. Facet Analysis is a process in 
which the researcher examines the correspondence between empirical data and a facet 
definitional framework, whereas the research design for constructing Guttman’s “theory” is 
called a Facet Design (Shye et al. 1994).  
Notably, Guttman’s use of the term “Facet Theory” appears to be unique; Facet Theory is 
neither theory by the definition of Guttman nor by the definitions of others (e.g., Sutton and 
Staw 1995). We believe that Guttman’s “Facet Theory” is better understood as a methodology 
for developing Guttman’s “theory”. In contemporary language, Facet Theory can be 
characterized as a methodology for construct definition, operationalization, and validation. To 
avoid confusion, we use the term Facet Theory Methodology rather than Facet Theory in the 
following discussion. 
4.3 Impact of Facet Theory Methodology 
Guttman’s (1954a; 1954b) creative work on Facet Theory Methodology (FTM) influenced 
various disciplines and areas. A main contribution of FTM is to the development of 
measurement theory in Psychometrics or the methodology of measurement (Guttman 1971); 
in particular, FTM is sometimes considered to be the forerunner of factor analysis (e.g., Lange 
2008; McGrath 1984; Loehlin 1998). In addition, some techniques of FTM (e.g., Facet Analysis 
techniques) are being used for studying work commitment (Carmeli et al. 2007; Morrow 1983), 
work values (Elizur 1984), and interpersonal trust (Paul and McDaniel 2004), or in 
combination with other methods for measurement scale development (Chin et al. 2008) and 
data analysis (Loehlin 1998). FTM can also provide meaningful interpretation for procedures 
taken in statistical techniques, such as Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) (Borg and Groenen 
2005). According to FTM, the procedures of partitioning MDS space can be interpreted as 
ensuring each region being representative of a facet element (Borg and Groenen 2005, p. 89). 
Moreover, FTM can assist with the development of typologies (Lange 2008; Shapira and 
Zevulun 1979). In particular, types of a typology differ by salient dimensions or facets. FTM 
gives explicit attention to the most important task in typology development: identifying salient 
facets for types in a domain of interest and appropriately organizing the facets (McGrath 1968; 
1984). Such explicit awareness can facilitate more careful comparison of otherwise identical 
types (McGrath 1968). 
The entirety of FTM is rarely employed and less so more recently. FTM, though claiming 
strength from comprehensiveness, is criticized for its inattention to a fuller research cycle. The 
“selection” of related concepts and facets, for example, relies partly on intuition, observation, 
or “general understanding” of a research domain (Shapira and Zevulun 1979). There is little 
systematic guidance for this initial selection process, which can, and often does, entail 
substantial effort and uncertainty (McGrath 1968). 
Furthermore, we suspect that the use of FTM is infrequent because of its inattention to links 
with existing knowledge. Scientific knowledge rarely exists in isolation; it must be a part of the 
larger scientific enterprise. It appears difficult to position FTM relative to other streams of 
thoughts. Some procedures in FTM are similar to those in other methods; notions in FTM too 
sometimes overlap with other contemporary notions (e.g., construct, item, measure, 
operationalization, etc.). However, there has been little effort to bridge the gap between FTM 
and contemporary notions and methods. It thus becomes difficult, if not impossible, to 
evaluate studies that use FTM or identify the core strengths of FTM. 
Regardless of these concerns, we argue that the implied logic of FTM may assist in clarifying 
overlapping concepts. We next discuss what the logic is and explore how we can use it for 
conceptual clarification.  
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4.4 A Deeper Look at the Logic of FTM 
The measurement and empirical analysis techniques of FTM have been a primary focus in 
previous literature (McGrath 1968; 1984; Lange 2008). We instead focus on the implied logic 
of FTM in which we believe the central value lies. 
To clarify the implied logic of FTM, a distinction between the “imagery” of FTM and that of 
other methods and approaches must be made (Shye et al. 1994). FTM conceives concepts, a 
priori, as closely related to other concepts from the same domain of investigation; a collection 
of these related concepts constitutes a content universe. FTM assumes that, ontologically, 
concepts can be likened to “continuous rather than discrete physical bodies” (Shye et al. 1994, 
p. 40). This ontological view can be contrasted with a relatively “mechanical view” of concepts, 
which regards concepts as discrete entities; according to this mechanical view, concepts can be 
independently defined and subsequently be used to investigate causal relationships among 
them (Shye et al. 1994). 
FTM imagery points to the imperative to delineate precisely the conceptual overlap among 
related concepts, prior to examining causal links to and from them. Further, an implicit logic 
based on the imagery can be used for clarification (McGrath 1968); this logic formally describes 
the structure and the state of a classification system that ought to clarify related concepts to 
the extent possible. 
McGrath (1968, p. 192 - 197) succinctly summarized the implied logic with a set of principles. 
We thus adapted McGrath’s (1968) principles to explicate the logic of FTM. Note that there are 
alternative terms used in the literature. For instance, McGrath (1968) and others employ 
“property” and “dimension” as synonymous with “facet” and refer to concepts as “objects” and 
elements of facets as “values” and “categories”. We replaced McGrath’s (1968) terms with the 
terms that are more familiar to the general IS community. The adapted principles are outlined 
as follows (McGrath 1968, pp. 192 – 197). 
P1: Concepts in a content universe should be specified in terms of all relevant facets. 
P2: The facets, collectively, should be logically exhaustive of the content universe. 
P3: The logical relationships among facets should be specified; independence among 
facets is preferred. 
P4: Each facet should be analysed into a set of collectively exhaustive elements.  
P5: Each facet should be analysed into a set of mutually exclusive elements. 
P6: The logical relationships among elements of a facet should be specified. 
P7: The relationships among the concepts defined according to the facets and the elements 
of facets should correspond to the focal phenomenon. 
This set of principles centres on clarifying overlapping concepts, the practice of which can be 
contrasted with a nomological view that emphasizes causal relationships among constructs. By 
recognizing a continuum of the similarity in the meanings of constructs, the principles 
encourage conceptual clarification without relying on causal links. The principles suggest any 
construct ought to be conceptualized based on the meanings of other related constructs. If the 
relations between a focal construct and other related constructs fulfil the requirements set by 
the principles, the conceptualization of the focal construct is considered to be clear.  
Positivists and constructivists might have distinctive expectations about construct clarity. For 
instance, positivist researchers might insist on a construct’s role in predicting empirical 
observables, and therefore might support the view that clear constructs must also enable easy 
operationalization across various contexts. In contrast, constructivist researchers might 
develop constructs merely to label particular phenomena within a context (i.e., not requiring 
that the constructs can be easily operationalized within other contexts) and hence, might not 
hold the same view on construct clarity as positivist researchers. Consistent with Suddaby 
(2010), we hold a relatively neutral philosophical stance, avoiding aligning with either view. 
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We believe our ideas presented may have pragmatic value for both (the relevance of the neutral 
stance is further amplified in the last principle illustrated in the subsequent section). 
4.5 Illustration of the Principles 
Drawing from our previous example of satisfaction (Table 1), we illustrate in detail the set of 
principles. 
Principle 1: Concepts in a content universe should be specified in terms of all relevant facets. 
It is important to ensure that every concept within a content universe is specified by all relevant 
facets. In the illustrative example, each of user satisfaction, user information satisfaction, and 
end-user computing satisfaction must be specified by all the two facets of evaluative response 
and evaluative target. In practice, this step is often done through systematic search and 
analysis of the literature. For example, Li and Belkin (2008, pp. 1833 – 1835) carefully 
searched all the relevant facets for the concepts of task; they begin with an initial identification 
of facets used explicitly or implicitly by extant literature and proceed further with categorizing 
facets and merging redundant facets. 
Principle 2: The facets, collectively, should be logically exhaustive of the content universe. 
The exhaustiveness criterion for facets is met if and only if including an additional facet will 
not achieve any further distinction of concepts in the content universe. This means the 
criterion of exhaustiveness can be a stopping point for searching for new facets. Assume we did 
not define evaluative target facet in the illustrative example; user satisfaction and end-user 
computing satisfaction are characterized as the same by existing facets. By defining the 
additional facet of evaluative target, user satisfaction and end-user computing satisfaction can 
be further distinguished. We can therefore conclude that the set of facets that contains only 
evaluative response is not exhaustive for the content universe consisting of these three 
concepts. In contrast, both facets of evaluative response and evaluative target are exhaustive, 
because all three concepts in this content universe are already distinguished from each other; 
any attempt to include more facets would not achieve further distinction. 
Principle 3: The logical relationships among facets should be specified; independence among 
facets is preferred. 
Relationships among facets must be clearly specified. It is preferred that facets are logically 
independent of each other; such a group of facets is most efficient (McGrath 1968). 
Independence means the determination of an element in any facet will not affect the 
determination of an element in another facet. If the independence criterion were violated, 
there would exist so-called “null cells” (in a cross-reference of all facets in multidimensional 
space) that would never be referenced (McGrath 1968).  
Again, using the illustrative example, assume we have defined an additional facet, called 
theoretical level, characterizing the level of theory to which the generalization of the concept is 
manifested (Kozlowski and Klein 2000). We further assume this facet has two elements, 
individual level and organizational level. This facet is not independent of the evaluative 
response facet, because when attitude is used to characterize concepts, by implication the 
individual level will always be used. In this example, the combination of attitude and 
organizational level will thus never be used to characterize any existing or potential concepts 
(here, we assume a collective’s attitude is no longer an attitude, but another type of evaluative 
response). The inclusion of theoretical level as a new facet will thus result in possible null cells. 
Null cells indicate inefficient use of facets and are undesirable. Parsimony or simplicity can be 
gained from efficient usage of facets. 
Principle 4: Each facet should be analysed into a set of collectively exhaustive elements. 
Elements within a facet should also be exhaustive. This exhaustiveness criterion for elements 
is met if and only if each concept in the content universe can be characterized by at least one 
element in each facet. Consider another variation of the illustrative example, where the 
evaluative response facet has only the one element, attitude. In such a case, the set of elements 
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for evaluative response facet is not exhaustive, because user information satisfaction cannot 
be characterized by any element in the evaluative response facet. In contrast, it is exhaustive 
only when evaluative response facet includes both elements of attitude and belief. 
Principle 5: Each facet should be analysed into a set of mutually exclusive elements. 
In addition to exhaustiveness, the elements in any facet must be mutually exclusive, such that 
each concept in a content universe can be characterized by only one element of any given facet. 
For example, all three concepts of user satisfaction, user information satisfaction, and end-
user computing satisfaction, can be exclusively characterized by either attitude or belief of 
evaluative response facet (never both). The elements in evaluative response facet are thus 
mutually exclusive. 
Principle 6: The logical relationships among elements of a facet should be specified. 
Relationships among elements of a facet must be clearly specified. There are several 
possibilities. For the evaluative target facet in the illustrative example, a hierarchical order of 
elements could exist, such as computer application and information system ranked from lower 
to higher level of analysis. Alternatively, the relationship between these two elements could be 
specified as inclusive – information system consists of computer application and other parts. 
All others being equal, any selection for the relationship among elements must be justifiable to 
the extent the purpose of the research is satisfied.  
Principle 7: The relationships among the concepts defined according to the facets and the 
elements of facets should correspond to the focal phenomenon. 
How can we know or assess the usefulness of facets and elements used? McGrath (1968) 
suggested “the principle of concordance or contiguity” for evaluating the usefulness of facets 
and elements. He (McGrath 1968, p. 197) argued, 
Regardless of the purpose of the system or the nature of the objects to be classified, 
though, it seems clear that the major aim of any a priori classification ought to be to 
order the objects in terms of their logical properties in such a way as to be predictive 
of their ordering on (meaningful) empirical properties. 
Concepts that are theorized to be alike should also be empirically alike (McGrath 1968). In the 
illustrative example, user satisfaction and end-user computing satisfaction are different on the 
evaluative target facet, whereas user information satisfaction and end-user computing 
satisfaction are different on both the evaluative response and the evaluative target facets. End-
user computing satisfaction can be interpreted as more “like” user satisfaction than user 
information satisfaction (by assuming equal contribution of every facet to “likeness”). The 
relationships among concepts or the “likeness” should be expected from empirical 
observations. Note that there might be other ways to operationalize “likeness”. 
We adapted McGrath’s (1968) “principle of concordance or contiguity” to accommodate 
diverse views. In particular, we believe that it is unnecessary to constrain the target concepts 
to those emphasizing empirical prediction; instead, for concepts that do not emphasize strong 
empirical prediction or “mirroring reality” (e.g., metaphysical or linguistic concepts such as 
“dilemma”, “paradox”, “system”, “adaptation”, and “punctuated equilibrium”), the researcher 
can establish the correspondence between a definitional framework and an (shared or not 
shared) interpreted or constructed phenomenon. The usefulness of facets and elements can be 
verified through the process in which the concepts are continuously used by a group of 
researchers. 
5 Discussion 
The logic of FTM offers guidance on clarifying concepts. Usually, first and foremost in 
clarification, is the need to explore and specify relevant criteria: To what extent can concepts 
be compared and contrasted? On what bases should comparison and contrast be achieved? In 
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response, the logic visualizes how concepts ought to be related and encourages continuous 
efforts toward the fulfilment of the vision. 
Inquiries into construct clarity must rely on a fundamental belief system. Kaplan (1964) 
observed an infinite regression that pervades scientific investigation. Answering one question 
can stimulate further inquiries into the assumptions taken in addressing the first question; it 
is crucial that we, at some point, stop asking “why” but instead believe certain assumptions. 
When clarifying one focal concept, we certainly could delve into more than one meta-
theoretical level, through, for example, treating facets and elements of the facets as unknown 
concepts and clarify their meanings before applying them to the focal concept. Such regressive 
clarification can go through several iterations. To avoid endless clarification, we must, 
however, at some point, regard the meanings of some concepts (or meta-theoretical concepts) 
as self-evident (e.g., the meanings of evaluative target and response in our prior illustrative 
example). From a more pragmatic perspective, Van de Ven (2007, p. 117) commented, 
Thus, even though the objective of semantic and constitutive definitions is to clearly 
specify the meaning and usage of terms, they always remain vague in some respects. 
Lines are and must be drawn for the pragmatic purpose of being sufficient to address 
the problem. […] Tolerance of ambiguity is important for scientific inquiry. 
A caveat should be noted. The prior illustrative example of satisfaction might unwittingly give 
the impression that only linguistic interpretation of a concept is emphasized. We note this 
impression is far from our intent. Specifically, it is unnecessarily restrictive in FTM to require 
that facets and elements must come from a linguistic or semantic definition of a concept, or, 
conversely, that a definition of a concept must include all facets and elements of the facets. Put 
differently, the proposed principles are not limited to a concept’s linguistic meaning, but also 
apply to its underlying, implied properties; facets and elements can be and often are absent in 
a definition (e.g., level of analysis). 
6 Limitation and Future Research 
This research is exploratory in nature and entails limitations. This research analysed construct 
clarity mostly by focusing on a construct’s relationships with extant related constructs. The 
complications of isolating the issue may need to be considered. Given the existence of other 
aspects of construct clarity, it remains less clear how the whole, rather than the sum of the 
differing aspects, of construct clarity can be achieved and to what extent these different aspects 
of construct clarity can be separately achieved. Furthermore, this research emphasized meta-
theoretical principles. Future research may consider specific strategies for using the meta-
theoretical principles in conceptualization. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper was initially motivated by the central importance of conceptualization and 
associated issues with research comparability and cumulative contribution to knowledge. Our 
reference to the IT value literature is used to illustrate the relevance of construct clarity and to 
enliven discussion of the issue within a broader IS community. We put forward the view that 
construct clarity is essential in conceptualization, and offered a meta-theoretical account of 
conceptualization that might help achieve construct clarity. This account explores what a 
clearly conceptualized construct ought to be. We hope these considerations can guide 
conceptualization practice and advance methodological theory of conceptualization. A related 
aim is to introduce Facet Theory to the IS research community and encourage its exploitation. 
We believe that the perspective taken in Facet Theory is largely absent from IS research and 
that attention to Facet Theory could offer much unexplored potential. 
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